Why Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Is an ‘Old Friend’ of China’s

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian on April 30 told reporters that Myanmar’s imprisoned democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is an “old friend” of China and that her circumstances have consistently remained on Beijing’s mind. He added the usual formula, that as a friendly neighbor, China “supports Myanmar in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions,” while encouraging “all parties to achieve broader, more robust, and sustainable peace and reconciliation.”

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was detained on the morning of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup and later handed lengthy prison sentences on trumped-up criminal charges. That means the regime categorizes her not as a political prisoner but as a convicted criminal. Denied access to her legal counsel and family, her exact whereabouts remain undisclosed.

Beijing’s official declaration that she is an “old friend” and that it worries about her circumstances is striking given the grudges the generals are known to harbor against the civilian leader. It undoubtedly causes discomfort for Min Aung Hlaing’s government and serves as a clear warning to military hardliners and elements within the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) who are intent on erasing her from the political landscape.

On the night of the Chinese Foreign Ministry remarks, the junta announced that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had already been transferred—sources say a week earlier—to a “designated residence” to serve the remainder of her prison sentence. The timing of the announcements suggests one of two things: either that the regime had coordinated its move with Beijing beforehand, or that Beijing rushed its announcement to pre-empt any deviation from a prior agreed script.

This aligns with a pattern of recent developments. When Myanmar’s election process started earlier in 2026, China’s special envoy noted the polls were proceeding in accordance with an earlier “agreement” between Beijing and the junta. Sources close to Chinese diplomats also indicated a pre-existing consensus about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s status. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar on April 25–26, reports suggest, he met directly with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi—a highly probable scenario given Beijing’s subsequent rhetoric.

‘Old friend’

In Chinese diplomatic parlance, the title of “old friend” is not bestowed lightly. It is reserved for figures who have fostered mutually beneficial political or economic ties with Beijing. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for example, who was instrumental in normalizing U.S.–China relations, remains the quintessential old friend.

In Myanmar, only two prominent figures currently hold this distinction: ex-dictator Than Shwe—and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Than Shwe earned the title by authorizing natural gas and oil pipelines across Myanmar territory that were born out of a strategic imperative articulated in 2003 by then-President Hu Jintao and known as the “Malacca Dilemma.” Hu recognized that the vast majority of China’s energy imports relied on the Strait of Malacca—a narrow maritime chokepoint vulnerable to blockades by rival powers, particularly the U.S. Hu viewed this as a severe vulnerability for China’s economic and energy security.

To mitigate it, Beijing accelerated the Myanmar pipeline project, expanded Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure, and bolstered its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. By facilitating the pipelines and the accompanying port and oil storage facilities on Rakhine’s Maday Island, Than Shwe cemented his status as an old friend of Beijing.

When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi took office in 2016, her National League for Democracy (NLD) government initially looked to the U.S. and Western allies for economic reconstruction. But that was slow in coming, and the 2017 Rohingya crisis triggered severe diplomatic and economic blowback from the West.

Isolated by traditional Western partners, she pragmatically pivoted toward China, which was eager to implement its massive infrastructure projects. She did, however, scrutinize Beijing’s investment proposals, continuously negotiating to safeguard Myanmar from potential debt traps, and successfully downsizing several projects to ensure mutual benefit.