Washington’s Myanmar gamble over rare earths and scam threats risks legitimising the junta

Mizzima Editorial

The Trump administration’s renewed secret talks with Myanmar’s military-backed rulers raise an uncomfortable question: is Washington pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, or helping rehabilitate a regime whose legitimacy remains deeply contested?

Two rounds of discussions in a month, including meetings in Naypyidaw and Tokyo, the latest meeting reported by Reuters, mark a striking reversal of the US approach following the February 2021 military coup.

The latest engagement suggests that Washington is increasingly prepared to deal directly with the generals, despite their record of repression, the devastating civil war, continuing allegations of serious human rights abuses, and the fact that democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi remains incarcerated.

The immediate American priorities appear straightforward. Washington wants cooperation in shutting down scam centres responsible for defrauding Americans of billions of dollars, while also exploring access to Myanmar’s valuable heavy rare earth deposits. These minerals are essential to technologies including electric vehicles and wind turbines, and reducing dependence on China has become a strategic priority for the United States.

Combating organised cybercrime is a legitimate objective. Myanmar’s scam operations have inflicted enormous financial and personal damage, and international cooperation is essential to dismantling them. But there are serious questions about relying on a military-backed administration when researchers say many scam operations function in territories out of the direct control of the junta, with some funds flowing to the military.

Can Washington realistically expect the generals to dismantle networks connected to their own sphere of influence and income? Without independent verification, concrete enforcement measures and accountability, diplomatic promises risk becoming a substitute for meaningful action.

The pursuit of rare earths presents an equally difficult challenge. Many deposits lie in territory controlled by ethnic armed organisations fighting the military, while China remains the principal buyer. Any American strategy built around access to these resources must confront the realities of Myanmar’s fragmented territorial control rather than treating the country as though the junta commands it in its entirety.

More fundamentally, Washington risks allowing commercial and strategic interests to overshadow the democratic aspirations of Myanmar’s people. Min Aung Hlaing remains under US sanctions over human rights abuses, his role in the coup and the military’s persecution of the Rohingya. The armed forces have continued to wage a devastating war against resistance forces and civilians.

Dialogue is not inherently wrong. Governments must sometimes engage with unsavoury actors to secure practical results. But engagement without clear conditions can confer legitimacy on those who seized power by force.

Japan’s tentative moves towards renewed cooperation add another dimension to this diplomatic shift. As Washington and Tokyo reassess their interests, they must not confuse access with influence, or negotiations with progress.

The test of American policy should be whether it delivers measurable benefits to ordinary people, advances accountability and supports a credible path towards democracy.

If the principal gains instead accrue to the military leadership and its commercial partners, Washington may find it has secured a transaction while undermining the very principles it once claimed to defend.

Chances are the Trump administration will not get far in Myanmar in obtaining rare earths or cracking down on scammers defrauding US citizens.

Sources: Mizzima, Reuters, AFP, SHAN