The Regime Is Laying a Trap for the US. Will Washington Fall for It?
Myanmar has become increasingly salient in Washington’s economic and national security calculus.
However, the country is far from simple. Its military and political power is dispersed across multiple centers, demanding deft handling and nuanced thinking.
In the absence of a single like-minded counterpart, Washington may be tempted to look for a shortcut and treat the military regime as the easiest channel through which to advance U.S. interests. Doing so would risk falling into the trap laid by Naypyitaw: mistaking access to the military regime for access to Myanmar itself.
Will Washington take the bait? Or will Washington resist this temptation and build a strategy around navigating Myanmar’s intricate and decentralized landscape?
Washington’s calculus
For Washington, the central question will be how to address two particular interests that converge in Myanmar as cost-effectively and reliably as possible. Washington is seeking to reduce dependence on China-dominated rare earth supply chains while confronting a rapidly expanding form of transnational organized crime that directly harms Americans. The country borders India and China, links mainland Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and is the world’s fourth-largest producer of rare earths. Myanmar also serves as one of the primary hubs for scam compounds that directly defraud Americans of billions of dollars.
Under the Trump administration, Washington’s foreign policy has fundamentally changed. Longstanding traditions of promoting human rights and democracy have now been deprioritized in favor of an “America First” approach interpreted narrowly as protecting core national interests. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) signed by Trump last November identifies “flexible realism” as one of its guiding principles. Under this approach, Washington seeks good relations and peaceful commercial ties with countries without requiring them to adopt democratic principles.
This change may have significant ramifications for Myanmar, where the U.S.’ concerns over democracy and human rights have historically been prioritized, constraining diplomatic engagement with the country’s military rulers and business deals that could benefit them.
Equally important, the NSS also recognized the Indo-Pacific as “among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds” and emphasized that successful competition in the region is essential to American prosperity. As Washington seeks to rebalance its economic relationship with China and reduce its dependence on China-dominated supply chains, Myanmar’s strategic importance could grow.
Washington’s calculus is also shaped by regional governments, including U.S. partners, and by its own private sector. Global volatility and geopolitical shocks have exposed vulnerabilities in regional supply chains and energy security. The added threat of economic coercion has placed greater pressure on governments, including the U.S., to seek stability and secure critical supply chains. To this end, regional governments have started high-level engagements with the regime to explore possibilities. These engagements may increase the appeal of normalizing relations with the military regime in Naypyitaw for Washington.
American businesses, whose voices carry weight, are watching these shifts as well. As regional governments signal openness to normalization with the regime, Myanmar may appear to become a viable market for foreign investment. These businesses may perceive that U.S. sanctions and other regulations could leave them at a competitive disadvantage to regional competitors. The first entrants into uncertain and unstable markets often absorb the greatest risks, but the willingness of American businesses to pursue investment despite uncertainty may make the prospect of securing an early foothold difficult to dismiss.
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