Report assesses the Sagaing segment of the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway

Mizzima

The Myanmar Policy Institute’s latest report for October examines the troubled implementation of the India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, focusing on the Tamu–Monywa section in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region between June and September 2026.

It MPI report concludes that escalating armed conflict, contested territorial control, damaged infrastructure and the humanitarian consequences of military operations make the full restoration of the highway unlikely in the near future. The report also highlights the strategic challenges facing India as it attempts to advance regional connectivity while Myanmar remains engulfed in conflict.

Proposed in 2002, the approximately 1,400-kilometre highway is a major component of India’s Act East Policy. It is intended to connect northeastern India with Southeast Asia through Myanmar, facilitating trade, investment and transport links with Thailand and the wider region. The route runs from Moreh in India’s Manipur State, crossing into Myanmar at Tamu before continuing through Kalewa, Monywa, Mandalay and other locations towards the Thai border at Myawaddy and Mae Sot. However, the February 2021 military coup and subsequent expansion of armed resistance have severely undermined implementation, particularly in Sagaing, where control is divided between the military and resistance forces.

The report divides the Sagaing section into three principal stretches. The Tamu–Kyigone–Kalewa road, approximately 150 kilometres long, was built with Indian financing and handed over to Myanmar in 2009. A subsequent Indian-funded project to replace 69 ageing bridges was suspended following construction-quality concerns and has not been fully revived. The coup and conflict further halted the project, leaving damaged bridges and unreliable access. Local administrative bodies affiliated with the National Unity Government (NUG) have undertaken limited repairs using local resources.

The approximately 121-kilometre Kalewa–Yagyi section has experienced intermittent progress. India approved grant assistance of INR 1,459.29 crore, approximately US$175 million, for its upgrading in 2019. Although construction slowed after the coup, some work has continued where access could be negotiated. In 2025–2026, paving advanced into parts of Mingin Township under resistance influence, demonstrating that construction can proceed through practical arrangements with local governance bodies even without unified territorial control. The approximately 76-kilometre Yagyi–Monywa section has already undergone upgrading under a Myanmar-managed arrangement, but the report finds insufficient evidence to establish whether regular civilian and commercial traffic can reliably use the entire stretch.

Military operations intensified in June 2026, following Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India. The military launched an offensive along the Tamu–Kyigone–Kalewa corridor, deploying several columns and reportedly around 1,000 personnel. It recaptured settlements, including parts of the Khampat area, with support from pro-military militias and armed groups. However, resistance attacks continued behind advancing troops, demonstrating that territorial gains did not necessarily translate into lasting control. Similar operations along the Kalewa–Monywa corridor enabled the military to reach Kalewa and announce that the road had reopened. Subsequent ambushes and fighting nevertheless challenged claims that the entire corridor was secure.

The distinction between military advances and sustainable road access is central to the report’s findings. Damaged bridges beyond Khampat continued to obstruct movement, while insecurity disrupted repairs and construction. Reopening individual stretches has limited value unless vehicles can travel predictably across the connected route.

The humanitarian costs have been severe. Military operations involving airstrikes, artillery and ground assaults reportedly killed and injured civilians, destroyed homes and displaced tens of thousands of people. More than 30,000 civilians were reportedly displaced along the Kalewa–Monywa corridor by late June, while displacement along the Tamu–Kyigone–Kalewa route affected residents of more than 50 villages by mid-August. Displaced families faced shortages of food, shelter materials and medicines. Looting, damaged homes and restricted access to farmland also undermined livelihoods and raised concerns about future food insecurity.

The crisis has spilled across the border into India. By early September, Manipur had recorded 24,475 undocumented Myanmar nationals, of whom 14,992 had reportedly been pushed back and 9,483 remained in temporary relief camps. These figures cover a wider period and cannot all be attributed to the 2026 offensive. The reported participation of Naga and Meitei armed groups fighting alongside the Myanmar military also raises concerns for Indian border security.

The report concludes that India must look beyond diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities in Naypyidaw. Progress depends on practical access arrangements with actors exercising effective authority along the route, including NUG-affiliated governance bodies. Rather than relying on official announcements or territorial claims, India should assess progress through completed bridge repairs, sustained construction and reliable civilian and commercial traffic.

Ultimately, the highway’s future depends on security, functioning infrastructure and workable local arrangements. Without these conditions, the IMT Highway will remain an unrealised regional connectivity ambition, while the conflict continues to impose significant human costs on communities along its route.