People’s Goal writes ‘Wind of Change’ report on defection and developments within the Myanmar military

Mizzima

The “Wind of Change” report provides a valuable and unusually detailed assessment of Myanmar’s military through the eyes of people who have served inside the institution and subsequently defected.

Produced by People’s Goal, the research is based on 60 in-depth interviews conducted between 2023 and 2026 with former soldiers, officers and military families. Its principal contribution is therefore not simply another account of Myanmar’s conflict, but an attempt to understand what is happening inside the military: why personnel leave, why many remain, how morale has changed, why mass defections have not occurred and what a future security sector might look like.

One of the report’s strongest findings is that dissatisfaction inside the military should not automatically be equated with defection. According to respondents, many personnel have lost confidence in the institution, particularly at lower and middle ranks, but remain trapped by surveillance, fear, economic dependency and concern for their families. Military housing, healthcare, education, pensions and salaries create powerful structural ties, while the threat of retaliation against relatives makes individual resistance extraordinarily dangerous.

The report consequently challenges the assumption that declining morale will inevitably produce a rapid military collapse. Instead, it portrays an institution that is internally weakened but still capable of using coercion to maintain discipline.

The distinction between formal CDM participation and battlefield defection is particularly important. The research suggests that formal defections peaked in 2021 and subsequently declined, while battlefield desertions and surrenders may be increasing in areas where troops face intense combat pressure. This distinction gives the report considerable analytical value. A decline in registered CDM participation should not necessarily be interpreted as renewed loyalty to the military. Instead, the means and circumstances of departure may have changed.

Another significant conclusion concerns the military’s resilience. The report argues that the junta’s survival rests less on popular legitimacy than on coercion, economic dependency, conscription, information control and external assistance. Respondents describe remaining public compliance as frequently driven by fear, economic necessity or isolation from independent information rather than genuine political support.

At the same time, the military continues to receive critical external assistance, particularly material support, aviation fuel, weapons and aircraft from China and Russia. The report therefore presents resilience as a combination of internal coercive structures and external support rather than evidence of broad public acceptance.

The report is also significant because it looks beyond the immediate conflict toward security-sector reform. Its respondents overwhelmingly reject preservation of the military in its current form and instead favour rebuilding the security institution under civilian control.

The proposed Federal Democratic Army is envisaged as a fundamentally new institution, incorporating personnel from different communities and armed organisations while subordinating the military to elected civilian authorities. Importantly, the report does not pretend that such integration would be easy. It identifies mistrust between former enemies, accountability for abuses, questions of command, recruitment and training, and the difficult relationship with Ethnic Armed Organisations as major obstacles.

Its treatment of accountability is another strength. The report does not advocate automatically absorbing every former military member into a future army. It proposes vetting, retraining and merit-based reintegration for suitable lower-ranking personnel, while arguing that senior officers implicated in serious crimes should face appropriate legal processes. Defectors, meanwhile, are viewed as an important reservoir of military expertise, although even they should be subject to transparent standards. This creates a potentially useful bridge between accountability and the practical need for experienced personnel in a future security institution.

The report’s principal limitation is also clear: its evidence comes exclusively from defectors and their families. It does not interview those who remain inside the military despite dissatisfaction, nor does it directly examine the views of EAOs on the proposed Federal Democratic Army.

The authors themselves acknowledge that the research does not yet incorporate the perspectives of Myanmar’s diaspora and that further study is needed on the legal framework governing defections, including the Defence Services Act. This means some conclusions – particularly estimates of military morale, public support and the prospects for mass defections – should be treated as informed assessments rather than independently verified measurements.

Overall, Wind of Change is most valuable as an insider-informed study of a military that appears increasingly dependent on coercion while suffering serious erosion of morale and institutional cohesion. Its central warning is that weakness does not necessarily mean imminent collapse. The military may remain dangerous and resilient precisely because personnel who have lost faith in it still lack safe alternatives. The report’s strongest policy message follows directly from this: supporting defectors is not simply humanitarian assistance. Providing legal status, livelihoods, family protection, vocational opportunities and credible reintegration pathways could influence the decisions of those still inside the military.

In that sense, the report is both an assessment of the present crisis and a blueprint for thinking about Myanmar’s post-military future. Its greatest contribution is to demonstrate that any transition will have to address not only political power, but also the people, institutions, incentives and security structures that have sustained military rule.