Myanmar in 2026 is a far cry from what it was in 2010

Commentary by Soe Myint, founder, managing director and editor in-chief of Mizzima Media

Let us address today’s post-election climate in Myanmar and recognize the major changes in comparison to the military-directed “democratic experiment” that began to unfold half a lifetime ago.

Let us shine a light on the situation today in comparison to what we witnessed following the 2010 election in Myanmar. As the reader may know, in the wake of the 2010 election Mizzima and I were the first independent Myanmar media to return to Myanmar in 2011, at a time when many others were reluctant and still considering the options. We knew that the country was not a full democracy, and we knew that there would be challenges, including personal safety. But we viewed the situation as a limited space for democracy, in which we could participate and expand the democratic process to realize a better society and cultivate conditions more favorable for a federal union.

At first, it appeared we had made a shrewd bet. General Thein Sein delivered openness and started a process of democratic reformation that appeared to offer hope and led to the 2015 election of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (after its first win in the 2012 by-election), the people’s choice, and a further landslide for the party in the 2020 elections. The democratic infrastructure was far from perfect – given the military maintained substantial control through the military-written 2008 Constitution – but the process appeared to offer the people a say in their future.

However, the 2021 coup by Min Aung Hlaing has changed most of everything about what we knew of Burma/Myanmar, and we are not going to return to what we had gained in the years between 2011 and 2021. I am very sure of this, unless Min Aung Hlaing is removed from Myanmar politics (and it is unlikely that he will remove himself from the scene). Min Aung Hlaing has more blood on his hands than any previous ruler, and is accused of genocide in international courts.

The people of Myanmar, particularly those who want peace, democracy, and a genuine federal union (including ethnic minorities), have completely lost trust in Min Aung Hlaing and the Myanmar military. The people are not looking for a regime change. They are looking for a system change. The people this time will never forget and forgive what they did to the people and the country since the coup. There must be justice and truth. Therefore, the struggle for democracy and a genuine federal union is poised to continue, at the very least in areas that the Myanmar military does not control.

To further elaborate on the situation today, I would like to respond to some common questions with regard to post-election Myanmar:

1) What are the chances of what happened after U Thein Sein took over, 15 years ago, repeating itself? Can we expect similar things, such as an opening up of the press and the economy to foreign visitors?

Changes such as this will not happen at all for at least the next two years. The regime will attempt some cosmetic actions to try and attract Western and Asian investments, but no major responsible business investments will take the risk of investing in Myanmar. The business trust is gone. What is going to happen with the regime is completely the opposite of what happened after the 2011 openings.

The country will be tightly controlled by Min Aung Hlaing and the military, if they get their way, at least for the next two years.

2) Some regions and states are not fully controlled by Naypyidaw. Will the new government initiate political dialogues with rebel groups to try and achieve reconciliation?

Min Aung Hlaing and the regime will make some cosmetic and superficial calls, such as a nationwide ceasefire and/or temporary ceasefire with specific groups. However, nothing such as this will lead to genuine national reconciliation and/or peace, although there might be some on-and-off fighting or a temporary halt to fighting in some areas of the country. The bottom line is that the fight for democracy and self-determination in Myanmar will continue.

3) What are the chances of all political prisoners being released, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi?

It is expected that Min Aung Hlaing will release political prisoners this month, and possibly Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as well (to some extent), to try to show that they are changing. But all the repressive laws are in place. And with the support of China and Russia, those who oppose the regime in any way or any form will be arrested again. Therefore, the Myanmar jails under the regime will still have political prisoners, including media and journalists.

4) Who are the prominent civilian faces in the new government and possible experts who could lend sound advice to the government, including on economic and development matters?

It is unlikely that any of these people will have any real impact on what Min Aung Hlaing and the military thinks and decides. They cannot do much except to take orders from Min Aung Hlaing. They do not have an alternative; rather, they have to be loyal to Min Aung Hlaing. This is a military-led and military’s tightly controlled setup where Min Aung Hlaing remains as an absolute dictator.

That being said, we can expect that the regime will likely soon make an offer that exiles and the media can return to the country. Our response since the coup in 2021 has not changed. Mizzima and I will not return to areas such as Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw controlled by the junta unless there is genuine democracy, human rights, and a federal union. Enough is enough with the Myanmar military regime. Mizzima already operates openly in areas (at least 50% of the country) not controlled by the junta, and we are clandestinely operating in areas controlled by the junta. We do not need to depend on Naypyidaw to do our work.

In recognition of these realities, Mizzima’s Editorial Policy as of April 2026 and until further notice is anchored in the following principles:

(1) Mizzima will focus on the liberated areas.

(2) Mizzima will expose the wrongdoings of Min Aung Hlaing and military regime (along with China, Russia, and Belarus, which are supporting Min Aung Hlaing and the regime).

(3) Mizzima will highlight the struggle for democracy, human rights, and a genuine federal union both in liberated and not-yet-liberated areas.

(4) Mizzima will highlight the self-determination efforts of different ethnic nationalities.

We have time to continue the fight against Min Aung Hlaing and the Myanmar military and the fight for democracy, human rights, and a genuine (bottom-up) federal union. The Myanmar military has already lost at least half of the country’s territory over the last five years, and it is only a matter of time before they lose more. We have time, but the regime does not.

The reason we have time is that we have been and will be on the right side of the story – democracy, human rights, a genuine federal union – for which the people of Burma/Myanmar have been struggling and fighting for decades.