Malaysia Can’t Trust Min Aung Hlaing to Solve the Crisis He Created
As Myanmar’s putschist president Min Aung Hlaing arrives in Malaysia for a two-day official visit, refugee repatriation is at the top of the agenda.
Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry says Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim will discuss the “voluntary, dignified and safe repatriation” of Myanmar nationals and continue what it calls “constructive and principled engagement” with Myanmar.
To be sure, Malaysia has carried Myanmar’s refugee burden for years: public frustration with migrants is real, immigration is a burning political issue, and Anwar answers to Malaysian voters, not Myanmar’s opposition movement.
Talking to Min Aung Hlaing is therefore not, by itself, the problem. The problem is pretending that the military dictator can solve Myanmar’s refugee crisis when he is its principal architect.
Refugee-maker
Myanmar’s military was producing refugees long before Min Aung Hlaing. Rohingya fled in huge numbers under earlier military governments. But since taking command in March 2011, Min Aung Hlaing has been the chief refugee-maker of the current era.
Less than three months later, the army resumed major fighting with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), ending a 17-year ceasefire. The war eventually displaced more than 100,000 people in Kachin and northern Shan states. In 2015, war erupted in Kokang, and tens of thousands fled toward China.
Then came 2017. Min Aung Hlaing was commander-in-chief when the military launched its “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine State. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. UN investigators called for him and other senior generals to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The U.S. formally determined that the military committed genocide against the Rohingya, and the International Criminal Court prosecutor is seeking an arrest warrant for him.
When he seized power in a coup in 2021, the scale of displacement escalated, spreading war far beyond the ethnic borderlands into the Bamar-majority heartland. Towns were bombed, villages burned, and millions forced from their homes. Many fled abroad, some as refugees and others through migration channels that do not record their reasons for leaving.
The UNHCR now counts more than 4 million people displaced inside Myanmar and more than 1.6 million refugees and asylum-seekers abroad. About 304,000 of those abroad arrived after the 2021 coup.
Safe return?
After battlefield defeats depleted the military’s ranks, Min Aung Hlaing’s regime activated compulsory military service in February 2024.
There can now be no question of a “safe return” for anyone. The danger is not confined to the Rohingya, or to Muslims and ethnic minorities. A young Bamar Buddhist who has returned from Malaysia or elsewhere abroad can also be called up to fight his fellow citizens.
The Rohingya have already seen a crueler version: after denying them citizenship for decades, the military forcibly recruited Rohingya men and boys and sent some to fight the Arakan Army (AA).
The institution that has driven people out is now asking the world to trust its promise to receive them safely. And Malaysia seems willing to accept the pretense.
Min Aung Hlaing can’t promise what he doesn’t control
There is an even more basic flaw in asking Min Aung Hlaing to guarantee the “safe return” of the Rohingya: he no longer controls most of the places they would return to.
The AA now rules most of Rakhine State, including Buthidaung and Maungdaw, from where most Rohingya refugees fled. No agreement struck in Kuala Lumpur can guarantee safety in territory where Min Aung Hlaing’s writ does not run.
The United League of Arakan, the AA’s political wing, has sought to present itself as capable of governing a multiethnic Rakhine, establishing Muslim advisory bodies, placing Muslims in parts of the local administration, and promoting a common “Arakha” identity. AA chief Tun Myat Naing has said his group is building relations “step by step with the Muslim people” and building trust through actions rather than words.
But the AA leadership has also struggled to recognize Rohingya identity, often referring instead to “Muslims” or using the politically charged term “Bengali.” It too faces allegations from rights monitors of forced displacement and abuses against civilians.
A genuine return mechanism will eventually need the AA, Bangladesh, Rohingya representatives, and international agencies at one table. No mere handshake in Kuala Lumpur can settle citizenship, security, property, freedom of movement and accountability for abuses by all sides.
Ignoring the reality and treating engagement itself as a solution is a mistake Malaysia has made before.
Deja vu
In the 1990s, Mahathir Mohamad’s Malaysia was among the strongest advocates of bringing military-ruled Myanmar into ASEAN. Despite the junta’s human rights record and vocal Western opposition, Myanmar formally joined the bloc in Malaysia on July 23, 1997.
The logic was “constructive engagement”: bringing Myanmar inside would give ASEAN more influence over its generals than isolation. It did not work.
Instead, Myanmar’s generals gained the regional legitimacy of ASEAN membership. Repression continued. Aung San Suu Kyi spent much of the following decade under pressure and detention. The wars in the borderlands did not end.
Six years later, even Mahathir raised the possibility of expelling Myanmar if its rulers kept refusing to change.
As deputy prime minister in the late 1990s, Anwar himself challenged ASEAN’s rigid reading of non-interference, advocating instead “constructive intervention”: governments could not simply look away when domestic crises spilled over borders, citing Cambodia and Myanmar.
Yet nearly three decades later, the very same Anwar is opening Malaysia’s doors to another Myanmar military ruler.
In the 1990s, ASEAN spoke of “constructive engagement.” In 2026, Malaysia speaks of “constructive and principled engagement.”
What Min Aung Hlaing gains
Min Aung Hlaing has far more to gain from this visit than his hosts. Since appointing himself president earlier this year, he has sought acceptance through a string of foreign visits. An official reception by Malaysia, once among ASEAN’s stronger critics of his regime, gives him exactly what he wants: normalization.
Malaysia is entitled to pursue its national interest. If Anwar wants to talk trade, undocumented migrants or ASEAN diplomacy with Min Aung Hlaing, he should say so. But he should not make the visit look nobler than it is.
Kuala Lumpur must not repeat the failed experiment of three decades ago. The current military ruler of Myanmar has produced a disaster far larger than his predecessors’ and now uses it to justify normalizing dealings with him.
A refugee crisis does not end when a navy ship carries people back to Myanmar. It ends when people no longer have a reason to flee in the first place.
As long as Min Aung Hlaing’s military is bombing towns, conscripting young people and driving civilians from their homes, the refugee-maker cannot be the guarantor of their return.
Nyein Chan Aye is a Burmese journalist based in Washington, D.C., who previously worked for the BBC and Voice of America and writes on Myanmar and regional affairs.
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