Junta and Resistance Pursue Divergent Paths to Myanmar’s Political Future
Burma News International-Myanmar Peace Monitor (BNI-MPM) has characterized Myanmar’s competing political tracks—the military regime’s reliance on the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) framework and the 2008 Constitution versus the resistance forces' push for a Federal Democratic Union—as parallel pathways with no clear point of convergence.
Despite escalating military conflict, meaningful federal structures are taking shape among resistance groups, BNI said.
The analysis is featured in Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process – A Reference Guide (2025-26), published by BNI-MPM and formally presented at a book launch on October 14.
BNI-MPM has published these reference guides annually since 2013, with the latest volume marking its 11th edition.
During the event, Daw Tin Tin Nyo, secretary of the BNI Steering Committee, presented two core sections of the book: "The old and new peace processes running in parallel" and "Examining the emerging federal building blocks."
Daw Tin Tin Nyo noted an absence of genuine peace-oriented dialogue between the regime and resistance forces amidst intensifying military hostilities.
"We still haven't seen any signs of talks or negotiations aimed at peace between the coup regime and resistance forces. What we're seeing instead is military aggression increasing. At the same time, the coup regime is trying to expand the territories it controls so it can establish itself as a government and gain international recognition. That's why we're seeing the junta step up its military operations," she said.
BNI-MPM explained that the junta-led negotiation track remains anchored to the 2008 Constitution and the NCA, supplemented by a so-called "NCA Plus" approach tailored for ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have not previously signed the accord. During a recent meeting with the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), General Yar Pyae—chairman of the regime's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC)—signaled intentions to adopt models akin to the NCA Plus framework.
However, BNI-MPM emphasized that there is no indication the military has the will to relinquish the expansive political authority guaranteed under the 2008 Constitution.
"We haven't seen any signs that the junta is willing to make concessions on the military's role under the 2008 Constitution. Instead, we're seeing more evidence that it intends to maintain political dominance and control under the 2008 Constitution," Daw Tin Tin Nyo said.
The analysis also suggested that the regime's inclusion of the Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA)—a group previously detached from the formal peace process—represents an effort to draw new entities into negotiations.
The junta's negotiating partners include members of the NCA-signatory Seven Ethnic Armed Organizations (7 EAO) Alliance, and factions of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), such as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the SSPP.
The reference guide assesses that these groups have struggled to withstand pressure from the Chinese government, leaving them effectively entangled in the junta's NCA process.
In contrast, resistance forces share a strategic goal of establishing a Federal Democratic Union. They are systematically building alternative political and administrative governance structures to achieve this.
After forming the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) in 2021, these groups unified their political goals through mechanisms like the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC). These efforts advanced further with the creation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) on March 30, 2026.
Emphasizing a "bottom-up federalism" approach to establish federal governance from local levels upward, several interim administrative bodies have emerged.
These include the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC), the Chinland Council and Chinland Government, interim administrations for the Magway and Sagaing federal units, and the Mandalay Interim Governance Council (MIGC). Among them, the IEC was the first federal building block to materialize following the military coup.
Simultaneous coordination efforts continue across Mon State, Kawthoolei, and the Dawei regions through the Mon State Federal Council (MSFC) and grassroots initiatives.
Meanwhile, longstanding territorial governance systems established by the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), and the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) serve as distinct federal prototypes holding significant potential for a future democratic union.
By contrast, organizations engaging in dialogue with the junta have yet to produce credible federal governance institutions capable of integrating into a future federal framework.
While the regime hosted NCA anniversary commemorations and peace talks in Naypyitaw on October 15 and 16, attended by signatory EAO representatives and allied political parties, major opposition forces charted a separate course.
The KIA publicly rejected meetings in Naypyitaw, saying it would engage only interlocutors within China.
The BNI-MPM guide concludes that the junta’s peace track and the resistance's federal trajectory remain opposed parallel lines.
Whether these paths will ever converge depends entirely on all stakeholders' political will and willingness to negotiate equitable power-sharing arrangements.
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