Insights into the tightening relationship between sanctioned Russia and the Myanmar military junta

Mizzima

Europe would be wise to keep an eye on Russia’s relationship with Myanmar’s illegal military junta and be aware of the individual sanctions architecture of the EU regarding Russia and Myanmar.

A sanctions policy designed to starve Russia’s war machine – implemented due to Russia’s war on Ukraine – cannot afford to overlook Moscow’s most loyal client in Southeast Asia.

This was a subject discussed by journalists, policy experts, human rights defenders and civil society representatives from Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Ukraine who gathered in Kyiv on 19 October for the Crimea Global 2026 conference, discussing security cooperation, authoritarianism, Russia’s recruitment of foreigners, transitional justice, artificial intelligence, the future of democracy and Russia-Myanmar relations.

Given the themes discussed in the Crimea Global conference, it is interesting that subsequently a new report has just been released that examines the Russia-Myanmar nexus in detail. The report “Militocracies in Arms: Russia–Myanmar Relations” by Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and BA Polina Lebedeva, commissioned by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2026 examines the expanding political, military, intelligence and economic relationship between Russia and Myanmar’s military regime following the coup of February 1, 2021.

It argues that the partnership serves the interests of two authoritarian governments seeking to preserve their power while confronting international sanctions, economic difficulties and armed opposition – both are outlaws on the international stage with Russia at war with Ukraine and Myanmar at war with its own people.

For Myanmar’s military junta, Russian support provides essential weapons, technology and diplomatic backing. For Moscow, Myanmar offers an opportunity to extend its influence in Southeast Asia, cultivate an anti-Western partner and demonstrate that Russia can maintain relationships with governments isolated by Western countries.

The authors describe this relationship as an unequal but mutually beneficial partnership. Myanmar depends heavily on Russian military assistance, while Russia seeks to exploit the junta’s vulnerability to expand its strategic influence. However, the report cautions that declarations of friendship and ambitious economic agreements should not be confused with practical achievements. Military cooperation has produced tangible results, whereas many proposed investment projects remain unrealised.

Political interests and strategic objectives

Russia’s engagement with Myanmar forms part of a broader foreign policy strategy of supporting authoritarian governments in the Global South. Moscow seeks to capitalise on anti-Western, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments, presenting itself as an alternative to Western political influence. The report identifies similarities between the Russian and Myanmar regimes: both suppress political opposition, independent media and civil society, and both prioritise the survival of their ruling elites.

Relations have historical foundations, although Soviet–Myanmar cooperation was relatively limited for much of the period following Myanmar’s independence in 1948. Since the coup, however, ties have strengthened considerably. Russia has provided military equipment and political support, while Myanmar’s junta has endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reportedly supplied ammunition, mines and other military materials to Russian forces.

Myanmar’s military leadership also seeks to reduce its dependence on China, which remains its most important neighbour and a major source of political and economic support. Russia offers an additional source of military technology and diplomatic protection. Moscow, meanwhile, hopes that a continuing relationship with Myanmar will help establish a stronger Russian presence in Southeast Asia.

The partnership is nevertheless constrained by Russia’s war against Ukraine, Western sanctions, limited resources and China’s much greater regional influence.

Arms supplies and military technology

The report identifies arms transfers as the most consequential element of the relationship. Russia has become one of Myanmar’s principal military suppliers, providing fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery systems, radar, communications equipment, missiles and spare parts.

Drawing on United Nations investigations, the authors report that Russian enterprises supplied at least US$406 million in arms, raw materials and related equipment to Myanmar’s military or arms dealers during the first two years following the coup. Twenty-eight Russian suppliers were identified, and 16 had been sanctioned by Western countries in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Russian equipment includes Su-30 fighter aircraft, MiG-29 components, Yak-130 combat-training aircraft and Mi-35 attack helicopters. These systems have supported the military’s air campaign against resistance forces and communities perceived to support the opposition.

Drones have become an increasingly important component of the partnership. The report discusses Russian Orlan reconnaissance drones, Albatross unmanned aircraft and other surveillance and electronic-warfare systems. These technologies can improve battlefield reconnaissance, targeting, communications and the disruption of opposition drone operations.

The authors argue that Russian equipment, technical support and counterinsurgency expertise contributed significantly to the Myanmar military’s advances against insurgents in 2024 and 2025. They also describe reported Russian assistance with drone training, maintenance and operational planning.

Western components remain important to Russian drone production, including electronic chips and other dual-use technology. The report identifies potential sanctions-evasion networks and intermediaries through which restricted equipment may reach Russian manufacturers. It argues that more effective enforcement is needed to prevent Western-origin components from supporting military operations in Myanmar and Russia.

Military training and cooperation with Belarus

Military education and training reinforce the relationship. According to the report, Myanmar sends more than 300 military officers to Russia annually, where they receive instruction and familiarisation with advanced military equipment. Myanmar personnel also participate in Russian military competitions and exercises.

The relationship extends into naval cooperation. Joint maritime exercises have included training in submarine detection, torpedo operations and responses to maritime security threats. Although these activities demonstrate closer military ties, the report notes that regular joint air-force or infantry exercises have not been reported.

Belarus has emerged as another important partner. With Russia’s military resources increasingly committed to Ukraine, Belarus has helped fill gaps in equipment supplies, maintenance, training and military technology. Its cooperation with Myanmar includes air-defence systems, radar-related technology, weapons production and the training of Myanmar personnel at Belarusian universities.

These arrangements could strengthen Myanmar’s domestic capacity to manufacture and maintain military equipment, reducing some dependence on imported finished weapons. The authors therefore regard Belarusian involvement as an extension of the wider Russia-aligned military support network.

The use of Russian weapons and human rights

A central argument of the report is that Russian military assistance has serious consequences for Myanmar’s civilian population. The authors cite United Nations findings that the Myanmar military has committed killings, torture, sexual violence and the destruction and looting of villages since the coup. These actions have been assessed by UN investigators as potentially amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Russian fighter aircraft, helicopters, missiles and drones contribute to the junta’s capacity to conduct airstrikes and other military operations. The report argues that Russia continues supplying weapons despite extensive evidence of abuses and repeated international calls to halt arms transfers to Myanmar.

It also raises questions about Russia’s international obligations. Although Russia has not ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, the authors contend that its continued arms transfers conflict with relevant international legal principles and undermine efforts to prevent serious violations of international humanitarian law.

The report therefore presents the relationship as more than a conventional arms-trading partnership: it argues that continued Russian assistance helps sustain the military regime and its capacity to wage war against resistance forces and civilians.

Intelligence sharing and propaganda

Military cooperation is increasingly complemented by intelligence and information-sharing arrangements. The report describes a joint satellite-imagery analysis centre announced in 2025, alongside an offer by Russia to share reconnaissance satellite information with Myanmar’s military. Such assistance could improve the junta’s ability to monitor opposition movements and plan operations.

Myanmar officers reportedly receive intelligence training in Russia, including instruction in operating surveillance equipment and influencing online information environments. The authors nevertheless note that China appears to remain the more important intelligence partner for Myanmar.

The report also examines political messaging and propaganda. Russia and Myanmar support each other diplomatically, presenting their relationship as evidence of opposition to Western dominance. Russia has defended the Myanmar military in international forums, while Myanmar’s leadership has endorsed Russian positions on Ukraine.

The two governments have also supported each other’s contested electoral processes. Russia has assisted the junta’s preparations for its post-coup elections and participated in election-observation activities. The authors argue that such engagement can help the military leadership present itself as a legitimate government despite continuing conflict and repression.

Tourism and economic cooperation

Beyond military affairs, both countries are seeking closer economic ties. A visa-exemption agreement signed in October 2025 allows Russian and Myanmar citizens to visit each other for tourism or business for up to 30 days. However, the report warns that travel and recruitment arrangements can create opportunities for human trafficking. It describes cases in which Russians recruited for apparently legitimate jobs have been deceived and transported into scam compounds in Myanmar.

Energy is another important area. Myanmar seeks Russian oil supplies and cooperation in exploiting domestic hydrocarbon reserves, developing renewable energy and potentially introducing nuclear power through small modular reactors. These proposals are intended to address Myanmar’s energy shortages while creating longer-term commercial ties with Russia.

The most ambitious proposed investment concerns the Dawei Special Economic Zone in southern Myanmar. In early 2025, the countries signed a memorandum covering a proposed industrial development centred on a deep-sea port and oil refinery. Plans also include a coal-fired power station, petrochemical and fertiliser facilities, industrial infrastructure and transport links towards Thailand.

For Russia, Dawei could offer strategic access to the Indian Ocean and a stronger position in Southeast Asia. For Myanmar’s military leadership, it could attract investment, reduce dependence on China and provide a degree of international recognition.

Nevertheless, the authors emphasise the gap between announcements and implementation. At the time of writing, no Russian company or consortium had joined the Dawei project. Myanmar’s financial instability, continuing conflict, environmental risks and potential displacement of local communities all raise questions about its feasibility.

Financial cooperation and sanctions

Russia and Myanmar are also developing financial mechanisms designed to reduce their reliance on Western banking systems. These include direct payments in Myanmar kyat and Russian rubles, connections to Russia’s financial messaging infrastructure and the introduction of Russia’s Mir payment cards in Myanmar.

Such arrangements can facilitate bilateral trade despite restrictions affecting conventional financial channels. They may also make it harder for Western governments to monitor transactions if businesses and intermediaries exploit opaque structures.

However, the report makes an important distinction: it identifies risks associated with financial opacity and sanctions circumvention but states that there is no evidence that Russia is using Myanmar specifically to evade financial sanctions or launder money.

The broader concern is that alternative payment systems, together with informal financial networks and intermediaries, could weaken the effectiveness of sanctions intended to constrain the military regime and Russia’s war economy.

Policy recommendations and overall conclusions

The report concludes with nine recommendations, primarily directed at Germany, the European Union and their international partners.

First, it calls for expanded sanctions targeting Russian arms, oil and gas trade connected to Myanmar, including Russia’s shadow fleet. It recommends coordinated sanctions against Russian and Belarusian arms companies, intermediaries, vessels and banks involved in military supplies to the junta.

Second, it urges stronger monitoring of suspicious cargo movements, closer scrutiny of transit hubs and stricter enforcement of restrictions on dual-use components manufactured in Europe. It also advocates systematic mapping of Russian and Belarusian companies supplying Myanmar’s military.

Third, the authors call for improved documentation of alleged war crimes, cooperation between Myanmar opposition forces and international partners, and efforts to pursue international arrest warrants against individuals implicated in such crimes.

Other recommendations include closer cooperation with ASEAN countries, particularly Singapore, Thailand and India; better intelligence-sharing among Western governments on Russia–Myanmar transactions; a common European refugee and asylum policy for people fleeing political persecution; and a clear policy against support for cyber-scam centres.

Finally, the report recommends making any future resumption of European development cooperation and investment in Myanmar conditional on ending lethal weapons imports from Russia.

Overall, “Militocracies in Arms” argues that Russia–Myanmar relations constitute a strategic partnership in which military cooperation is far more developed than economic investment. Russian weapons, technical assistance and diplomatic support help sustain Myanmar’s military regime, while Myanmar provides Moscow with a partner in its wider campaign to resist Western pressure and extend its international influence.

The relationship has limits: Russia’s war against Ukraine constrains its resources, China remains the dominant external power in Myanmar, and many promised economic projects have yet to materialise. Nevertheless, the authors warn that the partnership should not be underestimated. They argue that coordinated sanctions, tighter controls on military supply chains and sustained international cooperation are necessary to reduce the flow of resources supporting both the Myanmar junta and Russia’s war effort.