EROs and PDFs maintain control of Tanintharyi’s rural areas
Mizzima
Ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in Tanintharyi have been able to maintain significant influence over rural areas despite failing to establish sustained control over major towns. Their position, however, remains under pressure as the junta continues to use air power, artillery and conscript manpower to regain strategic locations and secure key economic projects.
The resistance previously seized Maw Taung, a border trading town with Thailand, but the junta retook the town in May after deploying additional manpower, including conscripts, along with airstrikes and artillery. The loss demonstrated the difficulty resistance forces face in holding strategically important urban and border areas against concentrated military pressure, even where they retain broader influence in surrounding rural areas.
At the same time, changes within the resistance landscape could strengthen cooperation. On September 21, a regiment from the Kawthoolay Army (KTLA) rejoined the Karen National Union (KNU). Local media reported that commander Saw El Pow and 24 other personnel returned to the KNU, while the commander of the KNU/KNLA’s No. 4 Brigade said the former KTLA personnel would serve as KNU/KNLA soldiers. The development could further consolidate cooperation among resistance forces, although the KNU has not publicly released extensive details about the move.
Fighting has also intensified around the Dawei Deep Sea Port Special Economic Zone (SEZ), an area of potential Russian investment. A junta column of around 80 troops had been operating around the SEZ since September 25 before being intercepted in Yephyu Township and attacked again on September 29. The repeated clashes indicate the importance both sides attach to the area as the junta seeks to secure the wider project zone.
The military pressure comes as Tanintharyi faces severe flooding and landslides. Since September 26, heavy rains have triggered flash floods and landslides across Dawei District, including Launglon, Thayetchaung and Dawei townships. Four villages in Launglon were particularly badly affected, with mud reportedly covering about half of each village. According to the Launglon PaKaPa, 11 people were killed in Kadetngethain village and another seven villages recorded 16 deaths.
A junta column of about 100 personnel entered Launglon Township on September 28, reportedly for rescue operations, but instead took positions in Kyauksin Village, which was not among the areas worst affected, while Kayingyi Village was suffering from the landslide disaster.
The situation highlights another challenge for Tanintharyi’s resistance forces: alongside fighting to maintain their rural foothold and prevent the junta from consolidating strategic areas, they must respond to humanitarian emergencies with limited resources. Rescue efforts have reportedly also been delayed by lengthy questioning by junta authorities, further complicating access to disaster-affected communities.
Tanintharyi therefore presents a mixed picture: resistance forces retain considerable rural influence and continue to challenge junta movements, but the military’s ability to concentrate forces around strategic locations, combined with severe humanitarian pressures, continues to test their capacity.





Comments