Burma in the Balance: How China Calls the Shots

Ashley South

Since before the 1 February 2021 coup, the Palaung State Liberation Front–Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF-TNLA) has been seeking to engage with ‘the west’, in order to hedge against the influence of China. Of the seven northern Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in the heavily China-influenced Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), only the PSLF-TNLA and KIO have made serious efforts to provide services to communities, and reform governance administration through more inclusive practises and structures.

Following Operation 1027 in October 2023, the TNLA controlled all or part of 13 townships across Shan State and Mandalay Region, including many non-Ta’ang communities. In a significant effort to provide inclusive governance and services to all civilians in an expanded Ta’angland, in 2025 the PSLF-TNLA, together with a range of civil society representatives, and the Ta’ang National Party, established the Ta’angland Council (TLC). While the TNLA-PSLF is an armed group, the TLC is a civilian-led governance body. This model of bottom-up governance contrasts strongly with the top-down command style preferred by China, and demonstrated by most other northern EAOs.

The TLC initially received some western support for this experiment in at least partial democratization, but following the destruction of USAID in early 2025 most international aid has ceased. At present, the TLC is in discussion with international partners to support governance and services delivery to vulnerable civilians in Ta’angland, and Ta’ang CSOs have received a little support. However, the overall level of aid from western donors has been minimal, and in the political sphere almost non-existent.

In this context, since 2024 China has played an increasingly dominant role in Myanmar, particularly in Northern Shan state. The Chinese authorities have already pressured several EROs into giving up territory, including hard-won and strategically important towns to the Myanmar Army. Under intense Chinese pressure, the TNLA signed the Haigen ceasefire agreement in Kunming on 28 October 2025, following which the TNLA withdrew from Mogok and Momeik. Then in March 2026 the MNDAA overran Kutkai, with Chinese connivance. As of April 2026, the TNLA still controls the six core townships of Ta’angland.

The bombshell came on 15 April 2025 (Thingyan day), when the PSLF-TNLA issued a statement congratulating Gen. Min Aung Hlaing on assuming the presidency of Myanmar. The following day, six Ta’ang CSOs in the Ta’ang Civil Society Network issued a statement, sympathetic to the PSLF-TNLA, but denouncing the message sent to Min Aung Hlaing.

The PSLF-TNLA statement was a brutally pragmatic turn, reflecting China’s position as the dominant power, in Myanmar and globally. Effectively, China has a strong level of control over Myanmar, at least north of Loikaw – including geo-strategically important oil and gas infrastructure projects connecting Yunnan Province with the Indian Ocean through central Myanmar and Arakan or Rakhine.

These developments raise questions regarding the future of the seven-member FPNCC, and the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Meanwhile, with very limited international support, remaining anti-junta resistance forces continue the struggles for self-determination, democracy and human rights – at least in southeast Myanmar – while the Arakan Army (an FPNCC member) continues to control almost the entire Rakhine State.

An anti-junta Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) was launched on 30 March 2026, four days before the Hlutaw met in Naypyidaw to choose a new Myanmar president. The degree of inclusion was somewhat questionable, with the SCEF composed of already four allied groups (the Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, Chin National Front and Kachin Independence Organisation), plus the National Unity Government and a group of MPs elected in 2020. Several smaller armed groups took note, having gathered in November 2025 under the Spring Revolution Alliance, while the multi-stakeholder National Unity Consultative Council looked increasingly marginalised.

The new ‘Cold War’ reality in Myanmar pitches Chinese client groups (mostly in the north), junta proxy militias and the Myanmar Army, against western-aligned pro-democracy groups in the southeast and elsewhere. Unfortunately, while the former receive substantial Chinese support, the west has largely abandoned Myanmar’s struggle for democracy. In this context, other anti-junta forces may see little choice but to roll with the times.

After the collapse of a ten-year peace process, and over five years of brutal war, conflict-affected communities and armed self-determination movements will not easily trust the militarized and centralised state again. That was tried in good faith between 2011-20, as epitomized by the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA, from which the PSLF-TNLA was excluded). The previous peace process proved the Myanmar government and military to be unable and/or unwilling to address the grievances and aspirations of ethnic nationality stakeholders. A post-election scenario in which a military–backed ruling party proposes a ‘transitional road-map’ to supposed peace and political dialogue risks repeating the mistakes of the past – with one very important difference: this time round, EROs are (still) in a much stronger position, militarily, politically and in terms of territorial control, despite continuing air-strikes on civilian targets.

The most effective way to resolve humanitarian and political (and coming climate) crises in Myanmar is for the international community to recognise, and provide political and military support to, key resistance forces. However, if the world follows China’s lead and insists on ‘peace talks’, it is essential that (unlike in the 2010s) any ‘peace process architecture’ is constructed impartially, with equal recognition of the Myanmar government and Army, and anti-junta resistance forces. Should a push for negotiations emerge, the agenda would presumably be at first limited to ceasefire talks – given that key anti-junta forces (including the SCEF) have made the removal of Myanmar Army from politics a pre-condition of any political settlement.

Through decades of blood and struggle, and despite the failures of the NCA, the previous peace process saw ethnic politics returned to centre stage in Myanmar. This achievement must be defended.