Thailand’s New Deals with Myanmar and Washington’s Changing Priorities

As we approach the end of October, it is worth revisiting Myanmar regime leader Min Aung Hlaing’s official visit to Thailand in August, particularly in light of what has happened since. Within two months, Myanmar has concluded new technological cooperation arrangements with Thailand and Russia, while the United States has held two rounds of direct talks with the regime. These developments may look unrelated, but they point towards something considerably more interesting: the regime is expanding its international relationships, acquiring access to new technologies and developing opportunities for intelligence cooperation.

On August 6-7, Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand, where the two governments exchanged four cooperation instruments. The most interesting, no doubt, was a Memorandum of Understanding between Thailand’s Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA) and the Myanmar Space Agency. The agreement concerns Earth-observation technology and satellite information, officially intended for natural-resource management, environmental monitoring and disaster response.

As I discussed in my previous article, Buying Gas or Buying Surveillance? Gas-Rich Myanmar’s Deal With Russia, Moscow is already providing Myanmar with access to satellite and communications technology. Thailand’s new agreement adds another dimension to Myanmar’s expanding international technological cooperation.

But Thailand’s agreement is particularly interesting because satellite technology is only one component of the cooperation it is offering Myanmar.

The joint statement issued during the August visit contains an important commitment: Thailand officially pledged to support Myanmar’s membership in the Egmont Group, an international network of financial intelligence units (FIUs) that facilitates financial intelligence sharing across jurisdictions.

Thailand has been an Egmont Group member since 2001. Its Anti-Money Laundering Office already participates in the international network, and Bangkok has now committed to strengthening cooperation with Myanmar’s anti-money-laundering authorities, including information sharing and capacity-building.

Through Egmont cooperation, financial intelligence units can exchange information concerning suspicious transactions, financial relationships and the movement of funds across jurisdictions. The information can also help establish connections between individuals, companies and organizations operating internationally.

And what transactions are considered suspicious? Pretty much all of them—unless the Myanmar regime has personally approved them.

For the regime, acquiring such capabilities would represent a significant institutional development, particularly when considered alongside its expanding access to satellite technology.

The official justification is combating transnational organized crime. Both governments agreed to intensify efforts against online scams, narcotics and criminal networks operating along their shared border, including disrupting illicit financial flows.

The United States is pursuing similar objectives.

In September and October, American officials held two rounds of discussions with representatives of Myanmar’s military-backed government.

Following the regime’s release of American businessman Adam Castillo in September 2026, Washington is believed to be seeking cooperation from Myanmar’s military authorities to shut down cybercrime operations targeting Americans. Same old story—we’ve heard it all before.

But the Trump administration has its own priorities. There is little reason to interpret these discussions through the political priorities of previous administrations. The United States has a different president, and his administration is pursuing different interests.

What deserves attention is the relationship between these developments. Russia is expanding cooperation on satellite technologies. Washington is engaging the regime on transnational crime. Thailand is explicitly identifying the disruption of criminal financial networks as a priority, promising to strengthen Myanmar’s financial intelligence capabilities.

On October 23, Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow went further, welcoming the renewed American engagement with Myanmar. He explained that Thailand did not want Myanmar isolated or turned into an arena for geopolitical rivalry. Bangkok therefore welcomes U.S. involvement alongside its own bilateral cooperation.

The regime is developing relationships with governments whose interests are not identical but whose cooperation could nevertheless strengthen its technological and intelligence capabilities.

And that brings us to the possible consequences of combating transnational crime.

Cybercrime networks along the Thai-Myanmar border are obvious targets for financial investigations. But what begins as an international effort against scam centers could provide the infrastructure for a much wider witch-hunt.

The same mechanisms that trace financial transactions involving criminal networks can expose financial relationships involving independent media or NGOs. Banking information, company records, beneficial ownership structures and cross-border transactions can reveal how organizations are financed and who maintains commercial relationships with them.

The regime could therefore strengthen its ability to investigate financial flows involving ethnic armed organizations, political opposition groups and businesses across Myanmar, including those entirely unrelated to cybercrime.

Combined with improved satellite information, these capabilities could provide the regime with considerably greater visibility over both the physical infrastructure and financial relationships of organizations operating against it.

Officially, the objective is disrupting organized crime. But the regime has fought ethnic armed organizations for decades. It would be rather optimistic to assume that expanded financial surveillance capabilities will never be directed against political or military opponents.

There is another dimension to Thailand’s growing role in Myanmar, particularly concerning the United States.

U.S. legislative policy towards Thailand has changed considerably over the past three decades.

Remember the thIn 1995, the proposed Free Burma Act was rather uncompromising. Section 6 would have required the U.S. president to withhold assistance to Thailand until Bangkok fully cooperated in supporting Myanmar refugees and exiles. Section 7 demanded reports on Thailand’s treatment of refugees, students and exiles. Although the bill was never enacted, the message was clear: Thailand’s treatment of Myanmar nationals could come at a financial cost.ree Burma acts?

By 2003, Washington had apparently discovered the virtues of diplomacy. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act described Thailand as a close U.S. ally and called for Washington to work closely with Bangkok on human rights, political freedom and coordinated sanctions against Myanmar. The threat of withholding U.S. assistance had disappeared, replaced by considerably friendlier language about cooperation.

The BURMA Act of 2022 was even more accommodating. It supported humanitarian assistance and refugee protection involving Thailand and neighboring countries, without imposing comparable financial penalties on Bangkok over its treatment of Myanmar refugees. By this point, Washington was more interested in financing cooperation with Thailand than threatening to cut off assistance.

So, in 1995, U.S. legislators contemplated withholding assistance from Thailand over Myanmar refugees. By 2003, Thailand was being treated as a partner in implementing U.S. policy towards Myanmar. By 2022, cooperation with Thailand had become part of the broader framework for cross-border humanitarian assistance.

Now, in October 2026, Washington is conducting direct negotiations with the regime, and Thailand has publicly welcomed those discussions.

For organizations operating against the regime, these developments should be taken seriously.

The regime is establishing international relationships that can provide technological assistance, institutional development, financial intelligence cooperation and new channels of diplomatic engagement. These relationships do not depend on the regime resolving its conflicts with ethnic armed organizations or reaching an agreement with the National Unity Government (NUG).

If the NUG is underestimating the regime’s ability to develop such relationships, or underplaying the strategic importance of the capabilities being offered, that would be a serious mistake.

Military strength is not measured exclusively by the number of soldiers, weapons or territorial positions an organization controls. Access to information, institutional capacity and sustainable financing can be equally consequential.

The financial situation of Myanmar’s democracy movement is becoming increasingly difficult. For FY2024 and FY2025, Washington allocated $121 million annually to democracy, governance, human rights and humanitarian assistance programs concerning Myanmar. However, the Trump administration’s foreign aid cuts in 2025 affected several programs supporting pro-democracy organisations, including those operating in exile.

A November 2025 study by the Stimson Center interviewed 30 Myanmar civil society leaders, all of whom reported insufficient or short-term funding. Some organizations have already suspended activities, reduced staff or closed offices. International funding is also increasingly directed towards humanitarian assistance rather than political advocacy and institution-building.

A September 2026 study published in Civil Wars highlights the NUG’s financial difficulties, particularly its limited access to stable revenue sources due to its lack of control over substantial territory and economic resources.

Meanwhile, the regime is building international partnerships that could help it monitor its opponents and trace their finances. The NUG could find itself with fewer resources while the military acquires better tools to track and undermine it.

Ana Brown is a nuclear lawyer, academic and intelligence analyst specializing in defense economics, and an ALM candidate at Harvard University.