Ports, Pipelines and Power: Rakhine in the Shadow of China and India

Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visits to India and China were presented by the Myanmar military regime as diplomatic successes. In New Delhi and Beijing, the junta leader discussed trade, infrastructure, border security and regional connectivity. Agreements were signed, investment was encouraged and strategic projects were reaffirmed.

Yet beneath the optics of state visits and diplomatic ceremonies lies a more complicated reality: Myanmar’s military regime is seeking international legitimacy at a time when its territorial control continues to shrink, particularly in Rakhine, where the Arakan Army (AA) and the United League of Arakan (ULA) have emerged as the dominant political and military force.

The significance of these visits therefore extends beyond diplomacy. They reveal how Arakan has become a focal point of regional competition between China and India, while simultaneously exposing the limitations of any strategy that treats Naypyitaw as the sole actor capable of determining the future of major development projects.

Rakhine’s growing strategic importance

For both China and India, Myanmar is no longer merely a neighboring country. It is a strategic corridor to the Indian Ocean.

China’s interest centers on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a flagship component of the Belt and Road Initiative. The corridor links Yunnan Province to Mandalay and ultimately to Kyaukphyu on the coast of Rakhine. At its heart are the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and Special Economic Zone, which offer Beijing a direct route to the Bay of Bengal and reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca.

India’s strategic interests are equally clear. Through the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, New Delhi seeks to connect its northeastern states to the sea through Sittwe and Paletwa, strengthening trade and reducing reliance on the narrow Siliguri Corridor.

Both projects place Rakhine at the center of a broader geopolitical contest.

Political analyst Dr. Sai Kyi Zin Soe recently told DMG that Myanmar has become a country of strategic interest for both powers because each views access to the Indian Ocean as vital to its economic and security ambitions.

That competition is likely to intensify rather than diminish.

Diplomacy meets reality on the ground

The challenge facing both China and India is straightforward: many of their most important projects now lie in areas where the military regime no longer exercises effective control.

While the junta continues to hold Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, Manaung and several military positions, the broader political landscape has changed dramatically. Across most of Rakhine, the ULA/AA administers local governance, taxation, policing, judicial affairs and public services.

This reality was highlighted in a recent DMG report examining Min Aung Hlaing’s China visit. A local observer monitoring Chinese projects noted that while the junta may promise implementation of Belt and Road projects, many of those projects are directly connected to areas affected by conflict and increasingly influenced by the AA.

“The projects cannot move forward without some form of discussion with the AA,” the observer said.

That assessment reflects a broader regional reality. Neither Beijing nor New Delhi can ignore the political authority that has emerged on the ground in Rakhine.

The military regime may continue to sign agreements, but implementation increasingly depends on actors beyond Naypyitaw’s control.

Airstrikes and the contradiction of engagement

At the same time that China and India discuss trade corridors and development projects, the humanitarian situation in Rakhine continues to deteriorate.

On June 17, according to DMG reporting, Myanmar military jets conducted repeated airstrikes on Kyauktaw and surrounding areas. Local residents reported more than 10 bombing runs involving multiple aircraft over the course of roughly one hour. Preliminary reports indicated civilian casualties, including children.

The attacks followed a broader pattern that has emerged over the past two years. Villages, schools, hospitals, markets, detention facilities and displacement sites have repeatedly come under aerial attack.

This creates a striking contradiction.

Regional powers increasingly view Rakhine as a gateway for trade and connectivity, yet civilians continue to live under the threat of airstrikes. Infrastructure and investment are discussed in diplomatic meetings while communities on the ground face insecurity, displacement and humanitarian hardship.

The result is a region caught between competing visions of the future: one focused on strategic corridors and economic integration, and another defined by the immediate realities of war.

The future of Kyaukphyu

No project better illustrates these contradictions than Kyaukphyu.

For China, Kyaukphyu represents a strategic outlet to the Indian Ocean and a key component of long-term energy security. For the military regime, it represents an opportunity to attract investment and demonstrate international relevance.

For Rakhine, however, the project raises a more fundamental question: who will ultimately shape the political and economic future of the region?

AA leaders have repeatedly stated that they welcome foreign investment that benefits local communities and contributes to regional development. They have also publicly indicated a willingness to cooperate with international projects and provide security guarantees.

Such statements suggest that future engagement with Rakhine may increasingly require direct or indirect interaction with local authorities rather than exclusive reliance on the junta.

This does not necessarily mean formal recognition. But it does indicate a growing gap between international diplomatic practice and realities on the ground.

Beyond the state visits

Min Aung Hlaing’s visits to India and China undoubtedly provide the junta with diplomatic visibility. They allow the military leadership to project an image of international engagement despite ongoing conflict and political isolation.

Yet the deeper significance of these visits lies elsewhere.

They reveal that Rakhine has become one of the most strategically important regions in contemporary Myanmar. They demonstrate that China and India are both adjusting their approaches to protect long-term interests. And they underscore a political reality that is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: effective authority in much of western Myanmar no longer corresponds neatly with internationally recognized state structures.

As regional powers compete for influence and major projects move forward, the future of Rakhine will not be determined solely in Naypyitaw, Beijing or New Delhi.

It will also be shaped by the political realities that have emerged on the ground, and by the people who continue to live under the shadow of both geopolitics and war.

Aung Marm Oo is the editor-in-chief and executive director of Development Media Group (DMG), a news agency based in Rakhine. He faces charges under Myanmar’s Unlawful Associations Act and has been in hiding since May 2019.