Myitsone Dam: Myanmar’s Sovereignty on the Line

During his recent visit to China, regime leader Min Aung Hlaing reportedly agreed to revive the long-suspended Myitsone Dam project. For many, this is not merely an infrastructure development project. This amounts to the possible return of one of the country’s most controversial projects, without any meaningful public consultation, at a time when Myanmar is engulfed in full-blown civil war.

For years, opposition to the Myitsone Dam centered mostly on its expected devastating environmental, cultural and social consequences, all of which remain valid. However, another dimension deserves equal, if not greater, attention.

Concerns over the Myitsone Dam project go beyond the environment; it has security implications for Myanmar’s sovereignty.

Living under a ticking time bomb

The main dam, at the confluence of two tributaries that form the source of the Irrawaddy River, would be located 32 km from the state capital Myitkyina and would generate nearly 6,000 MW of electricity, mostly for export to China. In the face of unprecedented public opposition, the project was suspended in 2011 under the then president, Thein Sein.

The project lies near the Sagaing Fault, in one of Myanmar’s most seismically active regions. No feat of human engineering can completely eliminate the risks posed by the power of nature. There can be no turning back once the dam is built and the reservoir is filled. Therefore, for millions of people living downstream, the existence of such a massive dam in an earthquake-prone area would be akin to living with perpetual uncertainty, beneath a permanent time bomb. This psychological stress would become part of everyday life, forever.

A strategic foothold for China

One of the least discussed implications of Myitsone concerns the enormous area that would be submerged once the reservoir is filled. It has frequently been reported that the reservoir would cover an area roughly comparable to that of Singapore.

A reservoir of this scale would inevitably become a highly restricted security zone. Public access would be tightly controlled. Critical infrastructure of this magnitude requires continuous protection.

An important question therefore arises: who would ultimately provide that protection?

China knows that Myanmar’s military (and the Naypyitaw regime) will continue to face political instability and struggle to maintain control over large parts of the country until some form of political agreement is reached between the regime and the various ethnic armed groups that are fighting it. Consequently, China is unlikely to rely on the Myanmar military alone to protect its economic interests. For this protection, China may instead want to use its own private security companies, unilaterally if possible. China has reportedly already deployed private security personnel in several African countries to protect its economic interests.

Whether or not such a scenario materializes, the possibility deserves careful consideration, because the consequences would extend well beyond hydropower generation.

A permanently restricted area of this scale could provide China with opportunities for expanded surveillance, intelligence collection and long-term strategic presence that no previous foreign investment project in Myanmar has created.

The issue, therefore, is not simply about building and operating the Myitsone Dam; it is about the strategic influence and long-term control that could come with it.

Water as a strategic weapon

The Myitsone debate must also be viewed within a broader regional context. China’s control over upstream water resources increasingly shapes geopolitical relationships across Asia.

For example, China’s upstream dams on the Brahmaputra River have long generated concern in India because Beijing refuses to share critical hydrological data, such as records of water flows entering India and Bangladesh downstream. Likewise, dams constructed on the upper Mekong in Yunnan have significantly increased China’s influence over downstream countries including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Water management has clearly become an increasingly important strategic instrument throughout the region.

Once the Myitsone Dam is operational, China will have control over both the Irrawaddy River’s flow and critical hydrological information. Agricultural activity and the livelihoods of millions of people downstream, mainly ethnic Bamar in Lower Myanmar, could be at the mercy of China. China may not weaponize this information immediately, but it is entirely possible that it could do so at some point in the future.

The risks do not end there. Given the dam’s location near the Sagaing Fault, any catastrophic failure triggered by a major earthquake could unleash devastating floods downstream, potentially claiming tens of thousands of lives and causing immeasurable destruction to communities, infrastructure and the economy. The consequences would be irreversible. When either risk materializes, it will be too late.

If electricity is the goal, why the Myitsone Dam?

Supporters of the project frequently emphasize electricity generation, citing the dam’s projected capacity of 5,600 MW.

If electricity generation is the main objective, why continue insisting on the Myitsone site despite overwhelming public opposition and years of political controversy?

Myanmar has many other rivers with hydropower potential. Multiple smaller projects, developed in locations supported by local communities, could collectively produce comparable or even greater electricity while distributing environmental and security risks more evenly.

China’s continued determination to revive this particular project therefore raises strategic questions, makes the analysis above more compelling and deserves serious public debate.

How much of this electricity will Myanmar receive? For how long will China operate the dam, and when will it be transferred back to Myanmar? When it is transferred, how much technical know-how will China transfer (if any) to Myanmar? If China refuses to transfer technical know-how, what could Myanmar do? These questions need careful and serious consideration.

Yet successive Myanmar governments have failed to release the Myitsone Dam project agreement to the public. Consequently, the public remains in the dark, while only certain government officials with access to the agreement know its contents.

Selling Myanmar to China

The military coup of 2021 inflicted enormous suffering upon Myanmar. Thousands of people have been killed. Tens of thousands have been imprisoned, tortured or displaced. Entire towns and villages have been destroyed.

However, many politically informed Myanmar citizens have expressed to this author their belief that reviving the Myitsone Dam would be even worse than the coup, because it amounts to selling the country. They argue that military dictatorships eventually end. Governments change. Policies can be overturned.

By contrast, reviving the Myitsone project amounts to leaving a time bomb for future generations and could ultimately prove even more consequential, as it could create strategic dependencies that future generations and governments would find extremely difficult to reverse.

A test of national unity

The Myitsone Dam will be a test of Myanmar’s national unity. Ultimately, this is not simply an environmental campaign; it is a national sovereignty issue. Will Myanmar’s future continue to be shaped by its own people, or by foreign forces?

The future of the Myitsone Dam will not be determined by any single organization. The National Unity Government, People’s Defense Forces, ethnic resistance organizations, civil society, local communities, environmental groups and ordinary citizens all have important roles to play.

Those who genuinely seek an independent Myanmar, free from domination by any external power, must recognize that preventing the Myitsone Dam also means protecting the country’s political independence.

In short, regardless of political affiliation, ethnicity or previous loyalties, everyone who believes that Myanmar’s sovereignty should remain in Myanmar’s own hands shares a common interest in stopping the Myitsone Dam project once and for all.