Myanmar’s Morass: When Realpolitik Becomes a Shtick for Policy Reversals

Nicholas Kong

Myanmar’s junta chief-turned-president, Min Aung Hlaing, illustrated a recurring contradiction in international diplomacy during his October 7–8 visit to Malaysia: governments can insist that they have not recognized a regime while taking actions that enhance its international standing. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said the visit did not amount to recognition of Myanmar’s military-backed government. Yet he pledged to work towards Myanmar’s reintegration into ASEAN and publicly praised Min Aung Hlaing’s cooperation in repatriating Myanmar nationals. The formal disclaimer preserves Kuala Lumpur’s stated position, but it does not erase the political signal sent by a high-level reception and a public commitment to bring Myanmar back into the regional fold.

Anwar expressed appreciation to the self-appointed president for accepting the return of 10,493 Myanmar nationals from Malaysia since January, including nearly 1,500 returned on October 4. That group was the first in a staged process, involving approximately 5,000 people who had agreed to be repatriated. Malaysia presents repatriation as practical cooperation over migration and the burden of accommodating undocumented migrants. Yet the United Nations and human rights groups have warned that returning people to a country engulfed in armed conflict may expose them to persecution and forced conscription. When repatriation becomes a diplomatic achievement, the risks facing returnees can be overshadowed by the perceived usefulness of the military-backed administration as a partner.

Stated Principles, Diplomatic Practice

The question is not simply whether Malaysia has formally reversed its Myanmar policy. Its own statements expose a more subtle tension. On June 25, Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan told Parliament that Malaysia did not recognize Myanmar’s post-election administration and that engagement with Naypyidaw had not altered Malaysia’s or ASEAN’s position on the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). On July 2, Anwar called for a more pragmatic ASEAN approach involving all stakeholders, explicitly including the authorities in Naypyidaw, opposition political parties, ethnic armed organizations and local non-governmental organizations.

Malaysia’s earlier engagement demonstrated that such inclusiveness was possible. On April 17, 2025, Anwar met Min Aung Hlaing in Bangkok. The following day, he held a teleconference with National Unity Government (NUG) Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann. The two discussions were not equivalent in format or diplomatic protocol, but they reflected an attempt to maintain channels with different parties to the conflict.

The October visit raises a different question: whether the balance of that engagement is changing. A government can maintain that it recognizes neither a particular administration nor its claims to political authority while providing its leader with the visibility, protocol and bilateral platform associated with normal state-to-state relations. The issue is not merely what Kuala Lumpur calls its policy, but what its actions enable.

That concern was already evident within Malaysia. On July 11, former foreign minister and parliamentarian Saifuddin Abdullah criticized ASEAN’s decision to hold an informal meeting with a representative of Myanmar’s military authorities, warning that the move risked normalizing relations with the junta. His intervention preceded the July 12 meeting, at which ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed the 5PC and called for concrete progress on ending violence, releasing political detainees and delivering humanitarian aid.

The concern, therefore, is not that ASEAN has formally abandoned its framework. It is that the framework may lose practical force when bilateral engagement moves ahead without corresponding progress on its stated conditions. If the former commander-in-chief receives increasingly prominent access to regional leaders while other Myanmar stakeholders struggle for comparable opportunities, the result is an uneven diplomatic environment even if official declarations continue to endorse inclusion.

Performative non-recognition

A similar tension is emerging in Washington. US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Michael Vance met the coup leader in Naypyitaw in mid-September. The immediate objective was reportedly to secure the release of detained American businessman Adam Castillo, but the contact also opened the possibility of broader cooperation concerning online scam operations and rare-earth resources.

Securing the release of an American national and combating transnational crime are legitimate government responsibilities. The problem arises when a limited practical purpose becomes the entry point for broader political accommodation without measurable reciprocal progress. Washington’s approach illustrates how quickly an ostensibly narrow national interest can create an opening for the junta seeking to improve its international standing.

The US case and Malaysia’s approach are not identical, but both raise questions about the relationship between immediate practical gains and longer-term political consequences.

This is where the distinction between de jure recognition and de facto political normalization matters. Formal recognition is not the only measure of how an authority is treated internationally. High-level receptions, public expressions of cooperation and pledges of reintegration can confer political standing even when governments insist that their legal position remains unchanged. A disclaimer can clarify intent, but it cannot by itself neutralize the practical signal sent by official conduct.

Beyond Condemnation

For the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) and other resistance actors, condemning such engagement will not, by itself, alter the diplomatic environment. They must demonstrate effective governance in territories they administer, strengthen civilian protection against air attacks, and develop credible cooperation with foreign governments on shared concerns such as online scams, transnational crime, trade and regional security. Practical capacity and sustained engagement will matter alongside appeals to principle.

Governments, for their part, should be judged not only by whether they formally recognize Myanmar’s military-backed administration, but also by the consequences of their engagement. They can pursue humanitarian, consular, economic and security objectives without allowing one bilateral channel to become a substitute for inclusive political engagement. ASEAN’s 5PC commitments will have little practical value if their conditions are repeatedly affirmed in statements but lose influence in diplomatic practice.

Realpolitik is not inherently illegitimate. Governments must reconcile principles with security, economic and humanitarian interests. But realpolitik becomes a convenient shtick when declarations of unchanged policy are used to obscure a shift in practice. Diplomatic credibility rests not on the disclaimers issued by governments, but on whether their actions match their stated principles and produce demonstrable results.

This commentary was originally published in Eurasia Review.