Myanmar: Full-Service Autocracy
nsight Myanmar
“You do create a dependency. You create a long-term relationship that also you can leverage into political influence as well.” For Ian Storey, a principal fellow at the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore who studies Southeast Asia’s relations with the major powers, and author of Putin’s Russia and Southeast Asia (published by Cambridge University Press), that dependency is central to understanding Russia’s place in Myanmar, according to the Insight Myanmar Podcast.
Moscow remains a secondary power in Southeast Asia, far behind China and the United States and economically overshadowed by several other countries, yet its relatively narrow strengths—arms, energy and nuclear technology—fit closely with the needs of Myanmar’s military government. The result is a relationship whose commercial value is modest but whose consequences reach deeply into the military’s ability to wage war, withstand isolation and plan for a future in power.
Myanmar’s reliance on Russia did not start with the 2021 coup. During the 1990s, Western sanctions left the military largely dependent on China for weapons, a dependence that increasingly troubled its commanders. By the early 2000s, dissatisfaction with Chinese equipment and a desire to diversify suppliers pushed the military toward a Russia that had recovered from the disorder of the post-Soviet decade. Myanmar continued buying from China while turning to Moscow for higher-end equipment, particularly fighter aircraft and helicopters. By the years preceding the coup, the relationship had acquired a personal dimension as well: Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia six times, toured defense facilities and developed comfortable ties with senior Russian officials. Even during the period of civilian government, military procurement remained under the armed forces, giving those relationships considerable continuity.
Weapons sales also created obligations that continued long after a contract was signed. Aircraft require ammunition, spare parts, maintenance, upgrades and trained personnel, making procurement the start of a continuing relationship rather than a single purchase. “You’re not only just buying the equipment; you’re buying doctrine, you’re buying language training, and you’re also buying training to operate that equipment,” Storey says. Russia has trained Myanmar military personnel both inside Myanmar and at Russian defense institutions; at various points Russian officials have acknowledged hundreds of Burmese soldiers undergoing training at a time, while Storey believes the total number present across Russian institutions could be considerably higher. Because most Russian defense companies are state-owned, these transactions also tie Myanmar directly to Russian state institutions rather than to a separate private arms industry.
CATCH THE PODCAST
Read more and listen to the Insight Myanmar Podcast here:
Comments