For a new strategic partnership between the EU and the legitimate Burmese democratic institutions

Cecilia Brighi and U Maung Maung

More than five years after the military coup of 1 February 2021, the European Union’s policy towards Myanmar has reached a strategic turning point. The policy framework adopted in response to the 2021 military coup reflected the political and strategic realities prevailing at the time. More than five years later, however, Myanmar’s political landscape and the wider geopolitical environment have fundamentally changed.

Until now, Burma has been perceived in Europe primarily as a human rights violation and humanitarian emergency, for which the European Union provided an additional €10.5 million in humanitarian aid for people affected by the conflict, bringing EU humanitarian support for the country to €49.1 million in 2026.

But today, Burma has become a major arena of geopolitical competition, in which Russia, China, and other authoritarians are expanding their political, military, and economic influence, thus disrupting the rules-based international order and challenging European strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Proof of this is the fact that since 2021, the head of the Burmese military junta, now elected as the puppet president of a terrorist civilian military government, has visited Moscow five times, striking strategic defence and financial agreements, including financial settlement mechanisms, with two-thirds of commercial transactions now conducted in Russian rubles. Similar official visits took place in India, China, Laos, and Thailand.

Myanmar should be integrated more clearly into the European Union’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Supporting democratic governance in Myanmar is not only a matter of 1) promoting democracy and human rights but also of 2) strengthening regional stability, 3) maritime security and the 4) rules-based international order in response to the growing influence of authoritarian powers.

Together, these four pillars provide the framework for a Strategic Reset that combines long-term institutional engagement with Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions, sustained strategic pressure on the military authorities, and a stronger geopolitical role for the European Union in the Indo-Pacific.

The European Union should explore the possible use of a non-lethal support program, similar to the European Peace Facility (EPF) as part of its broader Strategic Partnership with Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions. It might be seen as a provocation, but subject to the necessary political and legal measures, a program similar to the EPF could contribute to strengthening civilian protection, institutional resilience and governance capacity through support for: logistics, secure communications, medical evacuation, field hospitals, demining, non-lethal reconnaissance, training and other non-offensive capabilities.

A non-lethal technical support programme would require a detailed legal, political and operational assessment by the European External Action Service, the European Commission and Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions, including the National Unity Government (NUG), to ensure full compliance with European Union and international law. The establishment of a Strategic Partnership should also envisage a new political framework within which future non-lethal technical support programme, or a similar mechanism could be identified, through the adoption of financial measures that go beyond the traditional humanitarian support to contribute to the strengthening of the democratic forces. Myanmar’s internal political landscape has also evolved significantly. Despite continuing armed conflict, democratic institutions have progressively strengthened their coordination, governance structures and administrative capacities. The NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the establishment of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), democratic State and local administrations, democratic political parties, trade unions, democratic employers organizations, and civil society organisations together constitute an emerging federal democratic governance architecture that increasingly performs representative, administrative and public governance functions across significant parts of the country. These events demonstrate the continued evolution of an alternative democratic governance framework deriving from the popular mandate expressed in the November 2020 elections and aimed at supporting Myanmar’s democratic federal transition

A Strategic Reset for EU policy on Myanmar, in response to Myanmar’s transformed political reality and the evolving regional strategic environment is therefore needed. At its core is the establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions to provide a more effective framework for political dialogue, institutional cooperation and technical backing in areas essential to Myanmar’s democratic transition.

The European Union should complement this Strategic Partnership with an updated framework of pressure through strengthening the existing sanctions regime and the adoption of immediate priorities to prevent the normalization of the military authorities and of their illegal institutions; ensuring continued recognition of Myanmar’s legitimate representation within the United Nations system; strengthening support for the implementation of the ILO’s Article 33 Resolution; and enhancing coordination with ASEAN and like-minded international partners while preserving the clear distinction between democratic legitimacy and military control. While the Strategic Partnership represents a long-term framework, several priorities require immediate European attention. Together, these priorities would constitute the first practical steps towards implementing the Strategic Reset proposed in this paper.

• strengthening the European Union’s restrictive measures to increase the Strategic Pressure on the military authorities, including by adopting financial sanctions, strengthening restrictions on fuel supply chains, including measures that weaken the Burmese military by cutting off access to weapons and dual-use technologies; and addressing sanctions circumvention;

• preventing the international normalization of military rule and of the illegitimate institutions established following the illegal electoral process, while working for the democratic institutions recognition at the UN;

• continued recognition of Myanmar’s legitimate representative at the United Nations; maintaining clear political support for Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions in all relevant international fora;

• supporting the effective implementation and monitoring of the ILO Resolution adopted under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution;

• reinforcing political coordination with ASEAN through measurable benchmarks while maintaining continued engagement with Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions;

• integrating Myanmar more fully into the European Union’s broader Indo-Pacific strategic agenda.

Supporting Myanmar’s legitimate democratic institutions is no longer solely a matter of defending democratic values. It has become an essential component of the European Union’s broader strategy to strengthen the rules-based international order, reinforce stability in the Indo-Pacific, and respond coherently to the growing convergence of authoritarian powers. Any acceptance of the status quo, as defined by the military regime, would not only lead to the consolidation of a ferocious dictatorship in Myanmar, but would also strengthen the influence of several authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia and consequently would call into question political and economic interests and values intrinsically linked to the Europe.

Myanmar may be geographically distant from Europe, but its geopolitical consequences are not. Therefore, its crisis can no longer be viewed solely as a humanitarian one or a human rights concern.

Cecilia Brighi U MAUNG MAUNG, President CTUM

General Secretary

ITALIA-BIRMANIA.INSIEME