Opinion - How Asean can resolve its Myanmar dilemma post-election

YANGON: Derided by most international observers and the Myanmar diaspora as a sham, the recently concluded three-phase elections in Myanmar have entrenched military rule under a new constitutional government.

For Asean, the outcome throws into sharp relief an increasingly uncomfortable question: should it continue to marginalise the intransigent junta until it complies with the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC), or find a way to re-engage without betraying the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ own norms?

After a retreat of Asean foreign ministers in late January, Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro, also the Asean chair’s special envoy on Myanmar, clarified that the ministers had not reached a consensus “as of now”.

The chair’s statement, while maintaining that “any meaningful political progress can only take place in an environment of peace, security and inclusivity, supported by the cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue”, masks strategic divergences within the bloc, because exactly how to achieve “meaningful political progress” remains the key unanswered question.

One camp is prepared to give some weight to the election outcome, however flawed, believing it is the start of a political transition, now framed as a generic transition rather than a “transition to democracy” – Asean’s lingo for Myanmar back in the 1990s. For these members, Myanmar could be welcomed back once there is a semblance of a stable government, however unrepresentative, allowing a return to “business as usual” with the country’s leaders rejoining Asean meetings.

A second camp worries that unconditional acceptance would send the wrong message: that state-led atrocities committed against civilians can be swept under the carpet if the right institutional facade is in place. This position is grounded in concerns about human rights, accountability and legitimacy.

A third “middle ground” group supports Asean’s collective non-recognition of the military junta while maintaining low-key bilateral engagement, allowing room for ambiguity and quiet diplomacy with Naypyidaw.